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Information Asymmetry and Market Power in the African Banking Industry 
 
 
Abstract 
This study investigates the role of information sharing offices and its association with market 
power in the African banking industry based on a panel of 162 banks from 42 countries for 
the period 2001-2011. Five simultaneity-robust estimation techniques namely: Two Stage 
Least Squares; Instrumental Fixed effects to control for the unobserved heterogeneity; 
Instrumental Tobit regressions to control for the limited range in the dependent variable; 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to control for persistence in market power and 
Instrumental Quantile Regressions (QR) to account for initial levels of market power are 
employed.  
The following findings have been established from non-interactive regressions. First, 
the effects of information sharing offices are significant in Two Stage Least Squares, with a 
positive effect from private credit bureaus. Second, the GMM results suggest that, public 
credit registries increase market power. Third, from Quintile Regressions, private credit 
bureaus consistently increase market power throughout the conditional distributions of 
market power. Given that the above findings are contrary to theoretical postulations, we 
extended the analytical framework with interactive regressions in order to assess whether the 
anticipated effects can be established if information sharing offices are increased. Our 
extended findings show that: (i) negative net effect from public credit registries on market 
power in GMM regressions and; (ii) negative net impacts from public credit registries on 
market power in the 0.25
th
 and 0.50
th
 quartiles of market power.  
 
JEL Classification: G20; G29; L96; O40; O55 
Keywords: Information sharing; Market power; Information asymmetry, Africa 
 
1. Introduction 
The issue of bank efficiency and market power has been at the centre of economic research 
and analysis over the past three decades (see Townsend, 1979; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; 
Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007). The interest stems from the 
fact that market power may lead to inefficiency in the banking system, resulting in a net loss 
of social and economic welfare in the country (Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007).  Prior 
research evidence indicates that market power translates into a higher costs of financial 
intermediation, lower volume of savings and investment and consequently lower economic 
growth (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Djankov et al., 2007).  More specifically, both theoretical 
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arguments and empirical evidence highlight that banks with market power tend to hinder firm 
growth because such banks can extract rents from existing lending relationship (Petersen & 
Rajan, 1995; Marquez, 2002; Canales & Nanda, 2012).  
 
Aware of the negative effects of market power on economic growth, governments and policy 
makers in both developed and developing countries have embarked on policies aimed at 
enhancing competition and credit expansion (Buyukkarabacak and Valev, 2012). Prominent 
among the reform policies in the developing country context include: (i) the liberalisation of 
the banking sector under the auspices of the International Monetary Fund/World Bank; and 
(ii) the introduction of credit information systems (Luoto, McIntosh & Wydick, 2007; Triki & 
Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016; Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017). However, while the past 
decade has witnessed growth of information sharing offices in many sub-Saharan African 
countries, no study has systematically examined the effects of information sharing on market 
power (Ariss, 2010). The above is against the background that banking sector in sub-Saharan 
Africa is dominated by big players, such as Barclays bank, Standard Chartered bank, Société 
Générale and BNP Paribas, which confers market power on these banks. More importantly, 
market power may be particularly problematic in sub-Saharan Africa because of lack of 
transparency in corporate reporting, weak company law, under-development of institutions 
and severe information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers (see Boateng and 
Abdulrahman, 2012). Theory therefore suggests that, in countries where weak company laws 
and creditor rights are present, the establishment of information sharing offices would not 
only reduce the market power of banks and increase competition but would also improve 
credit allocation.  
Conversely, it may be argued that, if market power is reduced due to increased 
competition resulting in information sharing, banks incentives to generate and share 
3 
 
information may diminish (Marquez, 2002), thereby leading to resource misallocation 
because banks may generate insufficient information to make better judgement on credit 
decisions (Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2004). Petersen & Rajan (1995) echo similar views and 
point out that, increased in competition between banks due to information sharing may reduce 
credit availability, especially for new businesses. Petersen & Rajan (1995) reinforce their 
argument by pointing out that banks with market power are in a better position to carry out 
inter-temporal cross-subsidisation in lending relationships, and hence they are more likely to 
lend to risky young firms. The above arguments suggest that the impact of increased 
competition due to information sharing on market power and credit market in general is 
ambiguous. To Zaruskie (2006), an increase in competition because of information sharing 
may cut either way. The ambiguity surrounding the relationship between information sharing, 
market power despite the massive financial liberalization in Africa calls for investigation in 
order to increase our understanding of the role of information sharing offices and how they 
impact on market power. 
In this paper, we attempt to shed lights on the effect of information sharing offices on 
the market power in an environment where company laws, creditor rights and institutions 
appear weak. More specifically, we analyse the effects of credit information offices on market 
power based on 162 banks from 42 sub-Saharan African countries over the period of 2001-
2011. This study builds on this literature by investigating the relationship between 
information sharing offices and market power in African countries. The study contributes to 
the growing empirical literature on the role of information sharing in financial market 
development in an environment where credit rights, company laws and institutions are weak. 
The findings that information sharing offices exert insignificant effect on market power imply 
that information sharing offices are not having the desire effect of the reducing market power 
in the African banking industry. Therefore policy makers and governments should take steps 
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improve to upgrade the necessary infrastructure to facilitate the collection of accurate data and 
enhance efficient management and coordination of these office to improve credit allocation 
which are important for entrepreneurial activities and economic growth. 
The rest of the study is organised as follows. The next section reviews briefly the effects of 
information sharing on credit market. Section 3 covers the data and methodology while the 
empirical results and discussion are provided in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with 
implications and future research directions. 
 
2. Relevant Literature 
2.1 Effects of information sharing on credit markets 
Over the past three decades, a number of researchers have widely documented that most credit 
market failures are attributed to information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers 
(Besanko & Thakor, 1987; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2006). To 
alleviate information asymmetries, the establishment of credit information registers is 
becoming widespread in many developing and emerging countries (Djankov et al., 2007; 
Brown, Jappelli & Pagano, 2009). It is thus argued that, information sharing offices and credit 
registries provide an impetus for credit expansion, and arguably constitute an important 
determinant of credit market competition and profitability (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993; Padilla 
and Pagano, 2000; Karapetyan & Stacescu, 2014). The following section reviews the effects 
of credit information sharing on credit markets. 
At one end of the spectrum, it is argued that credit information sharing reduces moral 
hazard, information asymmetry, raises discipline on borrowers, fosters competition and 
consequently reduces bank market power. For example, scholars such as Padilla & Pagano 
(1997; 2000); Jappelli & Pagano (2002; 2006) and Bennardo et al. (2015) in their theoretical 
models contend that credit information sharing removes information differences across banks, 
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allowing them to make better lending decisions to all their borrowers. Thus the improved 
information leads to more lending and lower default rates. Similar studies by Klein (1992); 
and Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014) have rendered some support to above conclusion and 
indicated that borrowers are more likely to repay their debts because information about 
defaults are available to all lenders. As a result, the threat of higher interest rates in future or 
outright exclusion from the credit market provides a powerful disciplinary mechanism to 
encourage borrowers to pay their debts on time and in full. In short, both theoretical and 
empirical literature document that credit information sharing reduces information 
asymmetries, moral hazard, increases incentives for loan repayment, reduces over-borrowing 
and heightens competition and economic growth.  
On the other hand, while there is an agreement on the beneficial effects of credit 
information sharing, recent studies point to the dark side of information sharing. For example, 
Jappelli and Pagano (2006) and Brown et al. (2007) contend that, despite the fact that 
information sharing reduce default probability of individual borrowers, credit information 
sharing may also lead to greater access of credit to riskier borrowers too. Thus, the 
disproportionately higher entry of risky borrowers alter adversely the composition of the pool 
of borrowers resulting in greater default rates on the aggregate level. Others such as 
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) found that credit information sharing contributes to a 
banking crisis. Moreover, Petersen and Rajan (1995) point out that information sharing 
exposes lenders to increased competition as they release private information about their 
existing clients and lose the informational advantage over competitors and the ability to 
extract rents. Scholars also contend that the introduction of credit registries and information 
sharing could substantially curtail banks’ efforts to collect credit information. This is because 
the incumbent bank’s investment in soft information gets wasted as some of the unlucky high-
type borrowers identified are lost to outside banks. Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014) therefore 
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support the contention that when information is shared, the incumbent banks lose some of 
their advantages over their competitors. Hauswald and Marquez (2003) found that if 
competing bank’s access to hard information improves, it erodes the rents derived by the 
incumbent bank. Consequently, Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014) and Vercammen (1995) 
argue that banks may still fight to keep their competitive advantage by acquiring more 
information of different nature that is not shared with information sharing offices. It is 
pertinent to point out that, the above arguments appears to support the power theories of credit 
put forward by Townsend (1979); Aghion & Bolton (1992), Hart & Moore (1994); and 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) which suggest that the power of creditors (market power) and 
information are two key determinants of credit decisions. 
 
2.2 Information sharing and market power in developing countries  
The introduction of information sharing offices in developing countries is a recent 
phenomenon. In the context of Africa, information sharing offices were introduced over the 
past decade in order to mitigate severe information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders 
in the banking industry (Lin, Ma, Malatesta & Xuan, 2011). According to Jappelli and Pagano 
(2002), the theoretical connection between market power and information sharing is based on 
the expectation that the latter renders the banking sector competitive. They report that 
information sharing offices increases interbank competition because informational rents 
previously enjoyed by big banks are reduced by information sharing offices. Accordingly, by 
mitigating market power and making credit markets contestable, information sharing offices 
play the role of market brokers by ensuring more competition for credit, efficiency in the 
allocation of capital and reduction of credit constraints. However, despite the perceived 
benefits of information sharing offices, recent stream of financial development literature in 
developing countries indicate that, large banks may continue to reap the benefits of the market 
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power due to the under-developed nature of credit information systems and the weaknesses 
inherent in coordinating information sharing among lenders. One such study is that of Luoto, 
McIntosh & Wydick (2007) which gives account of the growth in credit information systems 
in developing countries with specific reference to Guatemala.  
In developing countries, a number of authors suggest that the size of the bank 
determines the interest rates charged on loans (see Beck & Hesse, 2006; Ahokpossi, 2013)
1
.  
In comparison to small banks, financial institutions with high market power are supposed to 
reduce their interest margins because of internal and external economies of scale. However, 
research evidence suggests that big banks with market power are rather inefficient (see 
Mitchell & Onvural, 1996; Karray & Chichti, 2013). Researchers point out that, instead of 
enhancing financial access, large banks use their market power to enjoy a ‘quiet life’ (see 
Mitchell & Onvural, 1996)
2
. This view maintains that big banks tend to use information 
sharing offices to augment their profit margins (Brown & Zehnder, 2010) instead of extending 
credit access. Others point to inefficiencies inherent in managing and coordinating the 
operations of large financial institutions resulting in considerable diseconomies of scale and 
poor performance leading to high interest rates charged to borrowers (Karray & Chichti, 
2013; Mester, 1992; Noulas et al., 1990). The abuse of market power by the big banks has 
motivated a recent stream of African development literature on the role of information sharing 
offices (see Barth et al., 2009; Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016; Tchamyou & 
Asongu, 2017), but these studies have focused on the relationship between information 
                                                          
1
 According to Beck and Hesse (2006, p.1), bank size substantially contributes to differences in interest rate 
spreads/margins in the banking sector. For example, in Kenya the high cost of loans is favourable to big banks 
compared to small lenders (see Ngigi, 2013a, b). Ahokpossi (2013, p. 1) has established that policies designed to 
promote competition and reduce market concentration would help lower interest margins in sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). 
2 The Quiet Life Hypothesis is a postulation that, banks with greater market power would invest less in pursuing 
intermediation efficiency. In other words, instead of tailoring the advantage of their favorable position to enable 
more borrowers to obtain loans at affordable prices, they would prefer to ‘exploit their market power’ for more 
gains or enjoy a ‘quite life’ (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). 
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sharing offices and the indirect use of market power to improve financial access.  It is 
important to balance this narrative with the view that financial access is not the only outcome 
of information sharing. Accordingly, the sharing of information can influence the credit 
quality (i.e. allocation efficiency) as well as the level of ex-post defaults.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study assesses a panel of 162 banks in 42 African countries with data from the 
World Bank Development Indicators and Bankscope for the period 2001-2011. The number 
of banks, countries and periodicity are driven by the lack of data availability. Information 
sharing data is only available from the year 2001. The choice of countries and banks is 
motivated by data availability constraints. Triki and Gajigo (2014) have recently adopted a 
similar dataset.  
 Following the study of Ariss (2010), the Lerner index is used as a measurement of 
market power
3
. The index measures the rate at which financial institutions set prices above 
marginal cost. Therefore, higher Lerner indices reflect greater market power. The procedure 
for computing the index is discussed in Section 3.2.1.  
 In accordance with Triki & Gajigo (2014) and Djankov, McLiesh & Shleifer (2007, p. 
303), information sharing offices are measured with private credit bureaus (PCB) and public 
credit registries (PCR). This study’s control variables include: (i) market-oriented 
                                                          
3
 While the choice of the   Lerner index is consistent with the literature, it is also important to note that the cost 
of granting a loan is not easy to measure. Accordingly, whereas a proxy average can be constructed by 
incorporating various costs (overhead cost, operating cost and cost for drawing deposits), the quality of loans 
may be contingent on bank- and country-specific features. For instance, an estimated cost of funding may not 
reflect the marginal cost associated with a ‘loan offer’, essentially because in a ‘loan offer’ accounts for loan 
risks. In summary, given two banks with identical funding cost, a riskless loan logically entails less cost 
compared to a risky loan.  
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characteristics (GDP per capita growth, inflation and population density); (ii) bank-level 
features (loan quantity, loan price, Bank branches and Deposits/Assets) and (iii) the 
unobserved bank heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity is articulated in terms of bank: 
‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Non-Islamic versus (vs) Islamic); size (large vs. small) and 
ownership (foreign vs. domestic).  The choice of these control variables is consistent with 
recent information sharing literature in the African banking industry (see Asongu & Le Roux, 
2016).  
 Looking at the anticipated signs from bank-oriented features, the following can be 
expected. (1) We anticipate loan price to increase market power because high interest margins 
resulting from higher loan prices can be a reflection of abuse of power by big banks. (2) 
Growing loan quantity can indicate decreasing market power owing to the intense competition 
within the banking sector that drives-down prices while simultaneously augmenting loan 
quantity.  We cannot establish with certainty the anticipate signs because increasing quantity 
of loans may as well  be the outcome of a group of banks making decisions to influence the 
quantity of loans to be circulated within the banking sector. (3) The ‘Deposit to asset ratio’ 
can positively or negatively influence market power because it can increase the quantity of 
loans and price of loans at the same time. Accordingly, given that the main sources of bank 
financing are deposits, a higher proportion of deposits among liquid liabilities can increase the 
interest rate margin and quantity of loans at the same time. (4) While a growing number of 
‘bank branches’ is an indication of banking sector competition, the corresponding growth in 
bank branches could also be the outcome of large banks increasing their outreach. Therefore, 
it is difficult to ascertain the direction of causality flowing from bank branches to market 
power.  
 The following are predicted as the expected signs from market-related characteristics.  
(1) While GDP per capita growth is employed to account for business cycle fluctuations, the 
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sign of its relationship with market power is difficult to establish because the effect depends 
on market expansion and dynamism. (2) It is very probable that the density of the population 
decreases the market power enjoyed by certain banks because it confers opportunities of 
investment in the banking sector. (3) Whereas high inflation could constrain some banks to 
quit the banking industry, stable/low inflation which is necessary for investment purposes 
could be an attraction for banks to set-up more bank branches across an economy. 
Accordingly, inflation is an important source of economic ambiguity and investors have been 
documented to be more inclined towards investment climates that are less ambiguous (see 
Kelsey & Le Roux, 2017).  
 It is not an easy task to establish expected signs from the dummy variables employed 
to account for the unobserved heterogeneity. (1) From logic and common sense, a growing 
number of small banks can decrease market power. (2) An increasing density in domestic 
banks can either positively or negatively affect market power because the impact depends 
inter alia on the concerns about inefficiency as well as issues about organisation and co-
ordination. (3) The impact of compliance with Sharia finance’ (Non-islamic vs. Islamic) is 
also not easy to establish because such an influence is contingent on inter alia: (i) 
organisational capacities of staff; (ii) dynamism and expansion of markets and (iii) constraints 
in fulfilling the requirements and needs of customers. 
 The definitions and sources of variables are provided in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 
presents the summary statistics whereas the correlation matrix is disclosed in Appendix 3.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Estimation of Market Power (Lerner Index)  
 The stochastic frontier model is employed in order to estimate the Lerner index which 
is the indicator of market power (see Battese & Coelli, 1992). Coccorese and Pellecchia 
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(2010) have argued that the model is better in comparison to other estimation techniques like 
approaches based on deterministic frontiers (see Aigner & Chu, 1968; Farrell, 1957). The 
selected empirical strategy accounts for the possibility that, beside the corporations’ 
inefficiency, deviations between the observed output and the frontier output could derive from 
other factors like stochastic shocks and measurement errors.  
 Let us assume that for firm i  at time t , production costs depend on input prices (W ), 
output ( Q ), random error ( v ) and inefficiency ( u ).  
If the inefficiency and random error terms are identically and independently distributed (iid), 
the logarithmic specification corresponding to the cost function can be presented as follows: 
 ititititit uvWQfC  ),(ln  ,                                                                          (1)      
where the error term and non-negative inefficiency terms are iid, following a normal 
distribution and a truncated normal distribution respectively. Hence, while itv  is 
²),0( vN  , itu  is ²),( uN  .       
The translog cost function is used to model the cost. It consists of one output and three inputs. 
The function was first proposed by Christensen et al. (1971) and later extended to a multi-
product framework by Brown et al. (1979). It has been widely applied in contemporary 
empirical literature (see Koetter & Vins, 2008; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Ariss, 2010).  
The cost function is as follows:  

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where Ni ,........1  and  Tt .........1 , are subscripts of banks and time respectively.
 
C is 
the total cost,  Q  is the output, hW  are factor prices, kW  are factor quantities and , while itu  
and itv  are respectively the error and inefficiency terms.  
 In order to estimate the cost, one output and three inputs are specified. The total 
operating cost is appreciated with the following: price of capital, price of labor, inputs by the 
price of deposits, output by total assets and total operating cost measured with overheads
4
. 
The Lerner index is then computed from the marginal cost and price (see Eq. 4). Whereas the 
former is derived from the translog cost function output (see Eq. (3)), the latter represents the 
price charged by banks on their output (total assets) and it is computed as the ratio of total 
revenues (net noninterest income plus interest income) to total assets.  
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where itP  is the price charged by a bank on its output. Accordingly, in theory the Lerner 
index can vary between 0 (in case of perfect competition) and 1. 
 
3.2. 2 Instrumentation and instrumental Fixed effects estimations   
 Five simultaneity-robust estimation techniques are employed, namely: (i) Two Stage 
Least Squares; (ii) Instrumental Variable (IV)
5
 Fixed Effects to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity; (iii) IV Tobit regressions to control for the limited range in the dependent 
                                                          
4
 The deposit price is calculated by dividing interest expenses by the sum of deposits, short term funding plus 
money market. The price of labor is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The price of capital 
is equal to the ratio of ‘other operating costs’ to the value of fixed assets.  
5
 Instrumental Variable and Instrumental are used interchangeably throughout the study.   
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variable; (iv) Generalised Method of Moments to control for persistence in market power and 
(v) IV Variable Quantile regressions to account for initial levels of market power. The 
employment of multiple estimation techniques is in accordance with data behaviour (Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016).  
The issue of endogeneity in the independent ‘information sharing office’ variables is 
tackled by instrumenting the corresponding public credit registries and private credit bureaus 
with their first lags. For instance, the procedure for instrumenting private credit bureaus is as 
follows in Eq. (5) below. 
  titijti PCBPCB ,1,,      ,                                                                                              (5) 
where tiPCB , , is the private credit bureaus indicator of bank i  
at  period t ,    is a constant, 
1, tiPCB , represents  private credit bureaus in bank i  
at  period 1t , and ti ,  the error term.  
The instrumentation procedure in Eq. (5) consists of regressing private credit bureaus on their 
first lags, then saving the fitted values that are later used as the independent variable of 
interest in Two Stage Least Squares, Fixed effects, Tobit and Quantile Regression 
specifications. The instrumentation process which is replicated for public credit registries is  
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. 
 The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) panel Fixed Effects (FE) models are presented 
respectively in Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) as follows: 
titih
h
htititi WPCBPCRL ,,,
10
1
,2,10,    

                                                                       (6) 
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where, tiL ,  
is the Lerner index of bank i
 
at  period t , 0  
is a constant,
 
PCR  is public credit 
registries,    PCB represents pubic credit bureaus,
 
W  is the vector of control variables  ( ICT, 
loan price, loan quantity, GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, 
Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches, Small banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks),
 i

 
is the 
country-specific effect and ti ,  the error term. The vector of control variables does not include 
dummy fixed effects (Small banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks) because these are by 
definition incorporated into country-specific effects in the FE model.  
 
3.2.3 Generalised method of moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions 
 There are four main reasons for adopting a GMM technique. First, the N>T (162>11) 
criterion that is essential for the application of the estimation approach is met given that the 
number of banks (or cross sections) is substantially higher than the number of time series in 
each cross section. Second, cross-country variations are not eliminated from the 
specifications. (3) The estimation approach has some bite on endogeneity because it accounts 
for simultaneity. Furthermore the use of time-invariant omitted variables                                                                                                   
also increases the control for endogeneity. (4) The system estimator corrects for biases in the 
difference estimator.  
  In accordance with Bond et al. (2001), the system GMM estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bond (1991)  and Blundell and Bond (1998) has better estimation properties 
when compared with the  difference estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Within 
the framework of this inquiry, we prefer the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and 
Bover (1995) because it has been documented to:  (i) account for cross-sectional dependence 
and (ii) restrict over-identification or instrument proliferation (see Love & Zicchino, 2006; 
Baltagi, 2008). In essence, the technique adopts forward orthogonal deviations instead of first 
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differences. The adopted specification approach is two-step because it controls for 
heteroscedasticity. It is important to note that the one-step approach is homoscedasticity-
consistent.   
The following equations in level (8) and first difference (9) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where,  represents the coefficient of auto-regression and t  
is the time-specific constant.   
 It is important to briefly engage exclusion and identification restrictions. As 
documented in recent literature, all explanatory variables are acknowledged as predetermined 
or suspected endogenous while only time-invariant variables are considered as strictly 
exogenous (see Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016). This is essentially because it is not feasible for 
time-invariant variables (or years) to become endogenous in first-differences (see Roodman, 
2009b). Hence, the process for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ whereas the 
gmmstyle is used for predetermined variables.  
 Given the above insights, time-invariant omitted variables (which are considered to be 
strictly exogenous) influence the Lerner index exclusively via the predetermined indicators. 
Moreover, the statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is investigated with the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments. In essence, the null 
hypothesis of this test should not be rejected for the time-invariant omitted variables to 
explain the Lerner index exclusively via the endogenous explaining variables. Therefore, 
while in the standard instrumental variable (IV) approach, failure to reject the null hypothesis 
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of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test indicates that the instruments do not 
explain the outcome variable beyond the suspected endogenous variables (see Beck et al., 
2003), with the GMM technique (based on forward orthogonal variations), the information 
criterion needed to investigate if time-invariant omitted variables are strictly exogenous is the 
DHT. Therefore, in the findings that are revealed in Section 4, this assumption of exclusion 
restriction is confirmed if the alternative hypothesis of the DHT corresponding to IV (year, 
eq(diff)) is  rejected. 
 
3.2.4 Instrumental Tobit regressions  
 The Lerner index theoretically is in the interval of 0 to 1. For this theoretical range, the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach may not be appropriate for estimation. A double-
censored Tobit model has been proposed by many authors to account for the limited range in 
the outcome variable (see Kumbhakar & Lovell, 2000; Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010; Ariss, 
2010).  Moreover, if no observations are of either 0 or 1 are apparent (as it is the case with the 
Lerner index), estimations by a double-censored Tobit model is similar to estimating by a 
linear regression model because the two likelihood functions coincide (McDonald, 2009; 
Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).  
The standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958; Carsun & Sun, 2007) is as follows: 
                                                         tititi Xy ,,0
*
,    ,                                                 (10) 
where 
*
,tiy is a latent response variable, tiX ,  
is an observed k1 vector of explanatory variables 
and ti,  
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where  is a non stochastic constant. In other words, the value of *,tiy is missing when it is less 
than or equal to   . 
 
3.2.5 Instrumental Quantile regressions 
 The preceding modelling approaches are based on mean values of the Lerner index. 
Unfortunately, mean values reflect blanket policies. Moreover, such blanket policies may be 
ineffective unless they are contingent on initial levels of market power and specified 
differently across financial institutions with high, intermediate and low market power. The 
concern about modelling exclusively at the conditional mean of the outcome variable is 
addressed with Quantile Regressions (QR) which enables the study to assess the nexuses 
throughout the conditional distributions of market power (see Koenker & Hallock, 2001; 
Okada & Samreth, 2012). Such a technique has recently been employed to examine the 
relationship between information sharing and financial access (see Asongu et al., 2017).  
 Cognizant of above facts, inquiries that investigate mean effects with Ordinary Least 
Squares are founded on the hypothesis of error terms that are normally distributed. Such an 
assumption of normally distributed errors terms is not valid in the QR technique. The 
estimation approach is robust in the presence of outliers because it enables the assessment of 
parameter estimates at various points of the conditional distribution of the outcome variable 
(or Lerner index) (see Koenker & Bassett, 1978).   
The  th quintile estimator of the Lerner index is obtained by solving the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (12) 
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where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
instance, the 10
th
 decile or 90
th
 decile (with  =0.10 or 0.90 respectively) are investigated by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of the Lerner index or iy given 
ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                                 (13) 
Where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are assessed only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the Lerner index. In Eq. (13), the dependent variable 
iy  is the Lerner index whereas ix  contains a constant term, public credit registries, private 
credit bureaus, loan price, loan quantity, GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population 
density, Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches, Small banks, domestic banks and Islamic banks. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results  
Table 1 presents the findings of Ordinary Least Squares, Fixed Effects and Tobit regressions. 
Given that we are employing instrumental variables for the independent indicators of interest, 
the corresponding estimation technique can be qualified as respectively Two Stage Least 
Squares, Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects and Instrumental Variable Tobit regressions.  
The table entails nine specifications, with three specifications for each estimation strategy. 
Whereas the first and second specifications for each estimation approach respectively, 
articulate the effects of public credit registries and private credit bureaus, the third 
specification emphasises both the effects of private credit bureaus and public credit registries.  
 The following findings can be established. First, the effects of information sharing 
offices are significant only in the Two Stage Least Squares, with a positive (insignificantly 
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positive) effect from private credit bureaus (public credit registries). Second, most of the 
significant control variables have the expected signs. For instance: (i) an increasing number of 
small banks reduces market power because as small banks enter the banking industry, they 
reduce the market share of operating big banks; (ii) domestic banks are likely to increase 
market power because the presence of foreign competition is needed to reduce the power 
enjoyed by big banks and (iii) increasing loan prices may be translated as growing market 
power because of the higher interest margins. The third point on loan prices is consistent with 
the conception and definition of market power: the setting of prices above marginal cost.  
Table 2 presents GMM results. The table entails six specifications, with one set of two 
specifications for public credit registries, private credit bureaus and information sharing 
offices. Each set of specification involves both a full sample and a partial sample. The full 
sample is from 2001-2011 whereas the partial sample is from 2005-2011. Two reasons 
motivate the adoption of the partial sample. On the one hand, it enables the inquiry to restrict 
over-identification or limit instrument proliferation given that T (time) is reduced. On the 
other hand, information from private credit bureaus and public credit registries in most of the 
sampled nations are available from the year 2005. Four principal information criteria are 
employed to assess the validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal deviations
6
. 
Based on the information criteria, public credit registries increase market power.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Market Power Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry  
                                                          
6 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
 Two Stage  Least Squares Instrumental Variable Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable Tobit 
 PCR PCB ISO PCR PCB ISO PCR PCB ISO 
Constant  0.244 0.270 0.229 -1.707*** -1.550*** -1.709*** 0.234 0.274 0.219 
 (0.269) (0.203) (0.320) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.172) (0.100) (0.209) 
PCR (IV) 0.003 --- 0.004 -0.0002 --- 0.0004 0.003 --- 0.004 
 (0.224)  (0.164) (0.959)  (0.934) (0.469)  (0.403) 
PCB (IV) --- 0.001** 0.001*** --- 0.005 0.006 --- 0.001 0.001 
  (0.016) (0.007)  (0.340) (0.345)  (0.387) (0.360) 
GDPpcg -0.0004 0.0009 0.0007 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.0009 0.0009 0.0003 
 (0.879) (0.781) (0.821) (0.554) (0.634) (0.621) (0.904) (0.896) (0.969) 
Inflation  -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.008* -0.008* -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
 (0.188) (0.214) (0.254) (0.107) (0.068) (0.083) (0.163) (0.112) (0.250) 
Pop. Density -0.0002* -0.00001 -0.0001 -0.016*** -0.017** -0..017** -0.0002 0.000007 -0.0001 
 (0.080) (0.924) (0.218) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.339) (0.973) (0.490) 
Deposit/Assets 0.133 0.140 0.152 0.119 -0.020 -0.002 0.134 0.135 0.153 
 (0.537) (0.511) (0.501) (0.636) (0.938) (0.993) (0.348) (0.348) (0.301) 
Bank Branches 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** -0.038 -0.042* -0.044* 0.010* 0.009* 0.008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.119) (0.083) (0.084) (0.069) (0.061) (0.145) 
Price of Loans  2.158 1.794 2.080 7.610*** 8.093*** 8.193*** 2.170*** 1.773*** 2.096*** 
 (0.107) (0.155) (0.127) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.003) 
Quantity of Loans  -0.019 -0.023 -0.022 0.760*** 0.755*** 0.767*** -0.019 -0.023 -0.021 
 (0.330) (0.264) (0.297) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.274) (0.326) 
Small Banks  -0.128** -0.131** -0.133** --- --- --- -0.132* 0.207*** -0.137* 
 (0.027) (0.021) (0.025)    (0.074) (0.000) (0.069) 
Domestic Banks 0.211** 0.210** 0.211** --- --- --- 0.210*** 0.077 0.210*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) (0.035)    (0.000) (0.647) (0.001) 
Islamic Banks  0.064 0.076 0.080 --- --- --- 0.067 0.001 0.082 
 (0.430) (0.348) (0.340)    (0.686) (0.387) (0.629) 
          
Fisher  3.80*** 4.92*** 4.35*** 11.44*** 11.84*** 10.22***    
R²/R² within/Pseudo R² 0.052 0.053 0.054 0.152 0.157 0.158 0.027 0.027 0.028 
LR Chi-Square       35.49*** 35.12*** 35.92*** 
Log Likelihood       -631.181 -632.351 -620.846 
Banks    137 137 137    
Observations  652 652 633 653 653 634 652 652 633 
          
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private 
Credit Bureaus. ISO: Information Sharing Offices.  
 
Table 3 presents QR findings corresponding respectively to public credit registries, 
private credit bureaus and information sharing offices in three blocks of specifications. 
Apparent differences in estimation coefficients of the independent variables of interest (in 
terms of sign, significance and magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of 
complementing the Two-Stage Least Squares, Fixed effects, Tobit and GMM regressions with 
estimations throughout the conditional distribution of the Lerner index. It is apparent from the 
results that private credit bureaus consistently increase market power throughout the 
conditional distribution of market power. Most of the significant control variables have the 
expected signs.  
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Table 2: Market Power Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (GMM) 
       
 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
       
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) Information Sharing Offices  
 Full Sample Partial Sample Full Sample Partial Sample Full Sample Partial Sample 
Constant  0.304* -0.821 0.322** 0.109 0.436*** 0.032 
 (0.060) (0.243) (0.034) (0.374) (0.001) (0.944) 
Lener Index (-1) 0.194*** 0.546*** 0.176*** 0.584*** 0.168*** 0.556*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR  0.0005 -0.0006 --- --- 0.001* -0.001 
 (0.475) (0.703)   (0.063) (0.353) 
PCB  --- --- -0.00003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
   (0.978) (0.654) (0.922) (0.865) 
GDPpcg -0.003 0.002 -0.004* 0.001 -0.003 0.004 
 (0.183) (0.409) (0.070) (0.499) (0.155) (0.121) 
Inflation  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0009 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.476) (0.487) (0.152) (0.663) (0.162) (0.281) 
Pop. density -0.00003 0.00008 -0.0001 0.00004 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.776) (0.568) (0.410) (0.620) (0.210) (0.190) 
Deposit/Assets -0.125 -0.068 -0.108 0.064 -0.153 -0.062 
 (0.327) (0.771) (0.384) (0.691) (0.131) (0.702) 
Bank Branches 0.005** 0.002 0.008*** 0.004 0.009*** 0.004** 
 (0.023) (0.305) (0.002) (0.161) (0.000) (0.040) 
Price of Loans  0.610 0.300 1.231** 0.231 1.202** 0.308 
 (0.371) (0.644) (0.033) (0.609) (0.011) (0.652) 
Quantity of Loans  0.058** 0.058*** 0.018 0.041*** 0.014 0.045*** 
 (0.049) (0.002) (0.447) (0.005) (0.550) (0.001) 
AR(1) (0.166) (0.134) (0.139) (0.134) (0.147) (0.690) 
AR(2) (0.561) (0.161) (0.530) (0.629) (0.483) (0.964) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.101) (0.000) (0.156) (0.000) (0.173) 
Hansen OIR (0.195) (0.534) (0.120) (0.732) (0.149) (0.519) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.885) (0.930) (0.215) (0.912) (0.835) (0.494) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.082) (0.307) (0.151) (0.522) (0.058) (0.478) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.175) (0.577) (0.151) (0.607) (0.205) (0.503) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.352) (0.383) (0.222) (0.707) (0.210) (0.453) 
       
Fisher  26.09*** 13.84*** 20.07*** 27.21*** 27.07*** 26.44*** 
Instruments  34 33 34 32 38 37 
Banks  133 99 133 98 133 93 
Observations  603 124 594 122 584 117 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
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Table 3: Market Power and Reducing Information Asymmetry (IV QR) 
                
 
Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
                
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) Information Sharing Offices 
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  0.110 0.405*** 0.670*** 0.732*** 0.783*** -0.014 0.397*** 0.690*** 0.802*** 0.817*** -0.056 0.400*** 0.689*** 0.739*** 0.787*** 
 (0.555) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.907) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.645) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR (IV) -0.002 -0.003 -0.0005 -0.0003 0.001 --- --- --- --- --- 0.002 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0003 0.0005 
 (0.620) (0.197) (0.669) (0.762) (0.276)      (0.253) (0.866) (0.383) (0.781) (0.598) 
PCB (IV) --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.001*** 0.0009** 0.001*** 
      (0.136) (0.008) (0.000) (0.005) (0.003) (0.038) (0.041) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
GDPpcg -0.004 -0.001 -0.0009 0.00008 -0.0003 -0.004 0.0008 -0.0002 0.00005 -0.00003 -0.003 -0.0002 0.0001 0.001 0.0008 
 (0.548) (0.757) (0.599) (0.967) (0.859) (0.378) (0.847) (0.849) (0.981) (0.986) (0.519) (0.963) (0.922) (0.627) (0.627) 
Inflation  -0.005 -0.0007 0.000003 0.001 0.0006 -0.002 0.001 0.00004 0.002** 0.001 0.0001 0.0008 -0.00006 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 (0.175) (0.806) (0.998) (0.094) (0.593) (0.515) (0.696) (0.958) (0.029) (0.311) (0.973) (0.786) (0.940) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pop. density -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001* -0.0001* 0.00001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.00002 0.00004 0.0001* 0.0001 -0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00007 0.00009 
 (0.665) (0.244) (0.057) (0.051) (0.829) (0.395) (0.391) (0.617) (0.566) (0.070) (0.565) (0.757) (0.225) (0.371) (0.266) 
Deposit/Assets 0.023 -0.068 -0.113*** -0.108*** -0.081** -0.015 -0.054 -0.092*** -0.124*** -0.038 -0.043 -0.044 -0.102*** -0.119*** -0.042 
 (0.886) (0.465) (0.001) (0.002) (0.017) (0.900) (0.556) (0.002) (0.002) (0.221) (0.703) (0.659) (0.000) (0.001) (0.162) 
Bank Branches 0.011* 0.008** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.009** 0.005 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 (0.053) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.148) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.659) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Price of Loans  1.494 0.333 -0.219 -0.479** -0.335 1.189** 0.169 -0.364** -0.851*** -0.614** 1.460** 0.254 -0.291** -0.556** -0.554** 
 (0.117) (0.439) (0.192) (0.013) (0.175) (0.039) (0.690) (0.009) (0.000) (0.011) (0.026) (0.586) (0.032) (0.010) (0.015) 
Quantity of Loans  -0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.010* 0.019 0.0008 -0.009** -0.005 0.0001 0.018 -0.0003 -0.009** 0.002 0.002 
 (0.916) (0.817) (0.363) (0.564) (0.069) (0.210) (0.946) (0.027) (0.416) (0.985) (0.214) (0.981) (0.027) (0.712) (0.692) 
Small Banks  0.074 -0.035 -0.033* -0.006 -0.048** -0.083* -0.045 -0.040*** -0.019 -0.053*** -0.072 -0.047 -0.039*** -0.019 -0.054*** 
 (0.287) (0.422) (0.061) (0.735) (0.015) (0.090) (0.293) (0.008) (0.386) (0.004) (0.123) (0.324) (0.006) (0.313) (0.002) 
Domestic Banks 0.125** 0.109*** 0.064*** 0.026* 0.023 0.174*** 0.074** 0.060*** 0.035* 0.021 0.155*** 0.094** 0.057*** 0.029* 0.015 
 (0.039) (0.002) (0.000) (0.066) (0.136) (0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.058) (0.156) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.059) (0.296) 
Islamic Banks  0.053 -0.027 -0.074* 0.033 0.003 0.089 0.001 -0.056* 0.013 0.021 0.111 -0.009 -0.054* 0.025 0.027 
 (0.734) (0.796) (0.074) (0.409) (0.925) (0.416) (0.988) (0.095) (0.782) (0.555) (0.287) (0.936) (0.087) (0.532) (0.445) 
                
Pseudo R² 0.052 0.036 0.045 0.057 0.079 0.059 0.042 0.058 0.070 0.096 0.058 0.041 0.055 0.065 0.088 
Observations  652 622 652 622 652 652 652 652 652 652 633 633 633 633 633 
                
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Market Power is least.  
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3.2 Extended assessment: increasing information sharing offices 
 Given that the effects of information sharing offices on market power are 
overwhelmingly positive, we extend the investigation by interacting information sharing to 
assess whether increasing information sharing offices could lead to the anticipated theoretical 
negative effects. Hence, we replicate the regressions with interactive specifications and 
compute the corresponding net effects. In Table 4 for instance, the net effect corresponding to 
the first GMM specification is -0.0047 (([0.0001 × 2.056] + (-0.005)). In the computation, 
2.056 is the mean value of public credit registries, -0.005 is the unconditional effect of public 
credit registries while 0.0001 is the corresponding unconditional impact from the interaction 
between public credit registries. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 4: Market Power Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry  
           
 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
           
 2SLS IV Fixed Effects IV Tobit GMM 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCR PCB PCB 
Constant  0.248 0.273 -1.702*** -1.521*** 0.239 0.277* 0.411*** 0.204 0.414*** -0.042 
 (0.312) (0.192) (0.001) (0.007) (0.171) (0.097) (0.000) (0.370) (0.000) (0.738) 
Lener Index (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.162*** 0.436*** 0.154*** 0.494*** 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR  --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.005** -0.002 --- --- 
       (0.041) (0.475)   
PCB  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001 0.003 
         (0.198) (0.228) 
PCR*PCR --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0001*** -0.00007 --- --- 
       (0.009) (0.424)   
PCB*PCB --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.00003* -0.00005 
         (0.064) (0.241) 
PCR (IV) 0.002 --- -0.009 --- 0.002 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.787)  (0.576)  (0.846)      
PCB (IV) --- -0.001 --- 0.016 --- -0.001 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.767)  (0.384)  (0.903)     
PCR(IV)*PCR(IV) 0.00003 --- 0.0001 --- 0.0003 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.872)  (0.565)  (0.875)      
PCB(IV)*PCB(IV) --- 0.00004 --- -0.0001 --- 0.00004 --- --- --- --- 
  (0.538)  (0.552)  (0.790)     
GDPpcg -0.0003 0.0009 0.005 0.002 -0.0007 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.903) (0.770) (0.556) (0.775) (0.918) (0.891) (0.169) (0.579) (0.108) (0.517) 
Inflation  -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008* -0.006 -0.007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 0.0005 
 (0.161) (0.214) (0.101) (0.065) (0.161) (0.111) (0.401) (0.654) (0.413) (0.750) 
Pop. Density -0.0002 -0.00001 -0.017*** -0.017** -0.0002 0.000001 -0.00009 -0.00003 -0.0001 0.000005 
 (0.111) (0.879) (0.007) (0.012) (0.338) (0.996) (0.332) (0.760) (0.243) (0.961) 
Deposit/Assets 0.131 0.140 0.129 -0.014 0.132 0.135 -0.0007 -0.169 -0.053 0.017 
 (0.561) (0.512) (0.607) (0.956) (0.359) (0.351) (0.991) (0.219) (0.544) (0.911) 
Bank Branches 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.036 -0.045* 0.010* 0.009* 0.005*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.005* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.138) (0.070) (0.072) (0.059) (0.002) (0.013) (0.000) (0.087) 
Price of Loans  2.148 1.827 7.600*** 8.070*** 2.158*** 1.804*** -0.199 -0.075 0.276 0.436 
 (0.123) (0.159) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.008) (0.595) (0.803) (0.356) (0.116) 
Quantity of Loans  -0.020 -0.023 0.761*** 0.743*** -0.019 -0.023 0.024 0.047*** 0.012 0.028** 
 (0.312) (0.267) (0.000) (0.000) (0.359) (0.264) (0.115) (0.000) (0.488) (0.018) 
Small Banks  -0.128** -0.133** --- --- -0.132* -0.131* --- --- --- --- 
 (0.023) (0.023)   (0.073) (0.074)     
Domestic Banks 0.211** 0.210** --- --- 0.209*** 0.208*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.033) (0.033)   (0.000) (0.000)     
Islamic Banks  0.063 0.074 --- --- 0.066 0.075 --- --- --- --- 
 (0.465) (0.351)   (0.692) (0.656)     
           
Net Effects of PCR n.a --- n.a --- n.a --- -0.0047 --- n.a --- 
Net Effects of PCB --- n.a --- n.a --- n.a --- n.a --- n.a 
           
AR(1) --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.360) (0.071) (0.317) (0.280) 
AR(2) --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.702) (0.108) (0.616) (0.274) 
Sargan OIR --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.112) (0.382) (0.071) (0.828) 
DHT for instruments           
(a)Instruments in levels           
H excluding group --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.371) (0.342) (0.185) (0.819) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.092) (0.425) (0.101) (0.680) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))           
H excluding group --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.060) (0.446) (0.015) (0.628) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) --- --- --- --- --- --- (0.605) (0.288) (0.946) (0.978) 
           
R²/R² within/Pseudo R² 0.052 0.053 0.153 0.157 0.027 0.027 --- --- --- --- 
LR Chi-Square --- --- --- --- 35.52*** 35.19*** --- --- --- --- 
Log Likelihood --- --- --- --- -631.169 -632.315 --- --- --- --- 
Fisher  4.30*** 4.49*** 10.19*** 10.55*** --- --- 52.54*** 64.32*** 38.23*** 54.39 *** 
Instruments  --- --- --- --- --- --- 46 45 46 43 
Banks   137 137   133 99 133 98 
Observations  652 652 653 653 652 652 603 124 594 122 
           
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients, Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the 
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AR(1)andAR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. n.a: not applicable because at least one of the estimated 
coefficients needed for the computation of net effects is not significant.  2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares. IV: Instrumental Variable. PCR: 
Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.   
 
 
Table 5: Market Power Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (QR) 
           
 Dependent Variable: Lerner Index 
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  0.178 0.480*** 0.724*** 0.736*** 0.794*** -0.024 0.389*** 0.695*** 0.793*** 0.833*** 
 (0.300) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.833) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR (IV) -0.009 -0.031** -0.010*** -0.003 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.333) (0.018) (0.000) (0.283) (0.609)      
PCB (IV) --- --- --- --- --- 0.004 0.007 0.003* 0.007** 0.004* 
      (0.377) (0.108) (0.064) (0.020) (0.079) 
PCR(IV)*PCR(IV) 0.0002 0.0003** 0.0002*** 0.00007 0.00005 --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.151) (0.017) (0.000) (0.280) (0.397)      
PCB(IV)*PCB(IV) --- --- --- --- --- -0.00004 -0.00008 -0.00003 -0.0001* -0.00007 
      (0.623) (0.270) (0.244) (0.052) (0.151) 
GDPpcg -0.005 -0.001 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.00004 -0.002 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.000005 
 (0.439) (0.764) (0.823) (0.877) (0.983) (0.583) (0.831) (0.846) (0.819) (0.998) 
Inflation  -0.005 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.001 0.0006 -0.001 0.001 0.00001 0.003** 0.001 
 (0.143) (0.834) (0.625) (0.152) (0.638) (0.505) (0.558) (0.987) (0.018) (0.382) 
Pop. density -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.0002*** -0.0001* -0.000008 0.0001 0.0001 -0.000009 0.00005 0.0001* 
 (0.379) (0.022) (0.000) (0.058) (0.935) (0.256) (0.354) (0.836) (0.503) (0.065) 
Deposit/Assets -0.022 -0.066 -0.146*** -0.112*** -0.102*** -0.014 -0.049 -0.089*** -0.126*** -0.065* 
 (0.880) (0.419) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.900) (0.556) (0.002) (0.001) (0.055) 
Bank Branches 0.011** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.009** 0.005 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 
 (0.043) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.105) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Price of Loans  1.364 0.126 -0.336** -0.498** -0.339 1.007* 0.047 -0.415*** -0.926*** -0.701*** 
 (0.129) (0.744) (0.019) (0.021) (0.232) (0.059) (0.903) (0.002) (0.000) (0.004) 
Quantity of Loans  -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.003 0.010* 0.022 0.002 -0.010** -0.002 0.002 
 (0.912) (0.928) (0.227) (0.584) (0.090) (0.111) (0.863) (0.016) (0.746) (0.737) 
Small Banks  -0.085 -0.058 -0.029** -0.012 -0.044* -0.068 -0.036 -0.042*** -0.013 -0.050** 
 (0.187) (0.147) (0.056) (0.535) (0.060) (0.128) (0.367) (0.004) (0.556) (0.010) 
Domestic Banks 0.132** 0.112*** 0.066*** 0.029* 0.026 0.161*** 0.067** 0.062*** 0.021 0.021 
 (0.021) (0.001) (0.000) (0.079) (0.138) (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.236) (0.194) 
Islamic Banks  0.032 -0.052 -0.019*** 0.035 -0.010 0.080 0.001 -0.056* 0.015 0.010 
 (0.826) (0.572) (0.008) (0.409) (0.818) (0.425) (0.985) (0.085) (0.749) (0.791) 
           
Net Effects of PCR n.a -0.030 -0.009 n.a n.a --- --- --- --- --- 
Net Effects of PCB --- --- --- --- --- n.a n.a n.a 0.007 n.a 
           
Pseudo R² 0.056 0.048 0.054 0.057 0.079 0.059 0.045 0.058 0.073 0.100 
Observations  652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 652 
           
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where Market Power is least. n.a: not applicable because at least one of the estimated coefficients needed for the computation of net effects is 
not significant. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus.   
 
 
 Table 4 presents Two Stage Least Squares, IV Fixed Effects, IV Tobit and GMM 
regressions. From the findings, only the net effect from public credit registries corresponding 
to the full sample is negative. It is important to note that for the GMM block, like in the 
baseline GMM regressions, two specifications are based on the full sample whereas the two 
other specifications correspond to a partial sample. In Table 5, positive net effects from public 
credit registries are apparent in the 25
th
 and 50
th
 quartiles.  
  
26 
 
4. Conclusion and directions of future research  
 This study has investigated the role of information sharing offices in market power in 
the African banking industry. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 banks from 
42 countries for the period 2001-2011. Five simultaneity-robust estimation techniques have 
been employed, namely: (i) Two Stage Least Squares; (ii) Instrumental Fixed effects to 
control for the unobserved heterogeneity; (iii) Instrumental Tobit regressions to control for the 
limited range in the dependent variable; (iv) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to 
control for persistence in market power and (v) Instrumental Quantile Regressions (QR) to 
account for initial levels of market power.  
 The following findings have been established from non-interactive regressions. First, 
the effects of information sharing offices are significant in the Two Stage Least Squares, with 
a positive effect from private credit bureaus. Second, in GMM, public credit registries 
increase market power.  Third, from Quintile Regressions, private credit bureaus consistently 
increase market power throughout the conditional distributions of market power. 
 Given that the above findings are contrary to theoretical postulations, we have 
extended the analytical framework with interactive regressions in order to assess whether the 
anticipated effects can be established if information sharing offices are increased. The 
extended findings show: (i) a negative net effect from public credit registries on market power 
in GMM regressions; (ii)  negative net impacts from public credit registries on market power 
in the in the 25
th
 and 50
th
 quartiles of market power.  It is important to note that insignificant 
effects established in the findings can be logically elicited. These insignificant results imply 
that information sharing offices are still not having the desire effect of the reducing market 
power in the African banking industry. There are two plausible arguments which may clarify 
this insignificance. From a direct viewpoint, information sharing offices may not be fulfilling 
their fundamental goal of increasing competition in the banking sector, reducing information 
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rents and rendering credit markets contestable (see Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 2019).  From 
an indirect perspective, complementary instruments of information sharing offices like 
information and communication technology and government institutions may not be adequate 
to enable information sharing offices to disclose time and adequate information.  
The authenticity of credit bureaus can ease exchanges of information among banks in 
order to reduce information cost, bank risk level and credit costs when banks such as Bank of 
Africa, Ecobank and Attijariwafa Bank are expanding their operations to a regional market 
(Buch, 2003). However, African credit bureaus may not be able to provide high quality of 
information disclosure (e.g. in terms of correctness, accurateness, comprehensiveness; 
discipline of borrowers, credit availability etc). This may reflect non-significant relationship 
recorded in this study.  In addition,  this non-significant results may be due to lack of good 
institutional framework such as weak legal systems, lack of sufficient regulatory 
environments and best practice, particularistic culture, relationships network ties and use of 
different language (see Dacin et al., 2002).  For instance, national culture oriented towards 
particularistic culture “favour strong personal relationships in which there is a shared set of 
norms and values” (Michailova & Hutchings, 2006, p.395). Hence, the absence of well-
functioning formal credit bureaus in Africa may yield inefficiency in the banking system due 
to this type of national culture. If the African national culture is dominated by universalism, 
information sharing would be better synchronised through the application of standards, rules 
and legal contracts which each credit bureau has to stick to. To our best knowledge, no study 
has found this insignificant relationship in the African banking system. As a result, this study 
has remedied this deficiency and advances our understanding in the context of information 
sharing offices - market power in Africa (Luoto, McIntosh & Wydick, 2007). In addition to 
particularistic national culture coupled with embryonic development stage, information 
asymmetry may play a key role in market power which raises a new inquiry for further 
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investigation. In the light of these clarifications, the insignificant results should not be seen in 
the light of a file drawer problem or publication bias in social sciences, where null or 
insignificant results are discarded in favour of strong findings (Rosenberg, 2005; Franco et al., 
2014). In essence, both significant and insignificant results make economic sense and have 
economic meanings.  
Despite the contribution of this study, its limitation should be explicitly 
acknowledged. One limitation of this study could be that, since it is conducted with data from 
African countries which do not have fully developed financial systems, some heterogeneity 
could be apparent in the nature and quality of information being shared. This is essentially 
because some coverage bureaus may be collecting more worthwhile information (e.g. share 
past default and repayment history, total exposure) than comparatively less developed 
coverage bureaus. Consequently, investigating whether the finding in this study may 
withstand further empirical scrutiny, by clarifying and accounting for differences in the 
quality of information collected by credit bureaus is an important future research direction.  
Future studies can also improve the existing literature by examining complementary 
policy tools that enhance the role of information sharing services in reducing market power. 
Moreover, given that this study is about the effect of sharing information on market power, it 
is also worthwhile to analyse the direct effect of information sharing on financial access and 
the indirect effect on other macroeconomic outcomes like investment and employment. It may 
also be interesting to relax the underlying assumption in this study and assess when having 
some market power in the banking industry may be good for an economy.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1:  Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of  Variables Sources 
    
Market Power  Lerner The ratio of the ‘difference between the 
Marginal Cost and Price’ on the Price 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Quantity  of Loans  Quantity Logarithm of Loans   BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
Public credit registries   PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Private credit bureaus  PCB Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, Open, 
Close, Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.   
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
Market 
Power 
Lerner 0.513 0.587 0.032 0.969 893 
       
Information Public credit registries  2.056 6.206 0.000 49.800 1240 
Sharing Private credit bureaus  7.496 18.232 0.000 64.800 1235 
       
 
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita 
growth 
13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
 
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
 
 
 
Dummy 
variables   
Large Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Small Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 3 : Correlation Matrix (Uniform sample size: 684) 
                 
Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Dummy-Controls Info. Sharing Lerner  
GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Price Quantity Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. PCR PCB   
1.000 0.136 0.007 -0.008 -0.068 -0.014 -0.026 -0.0002 0.0002 0.034 -0.034 0.0001 -0.0001 0.019 -0.163 -0.016 GDP 
 1.000 -0.028 0.037 -0.236 0.256 -0.009 0.046 -0.046 0.028 -0.028 -0.050 0.050 -0.205 -0.178 -0.062 Inf. 
  1.000 0.112 0.410 -0.029 -0.125 -0.098 0.098 -0.045 0.045 -0.088 0.088 0.546 -0.233 0.035 Pop. 
   1.000 -0.041 0.080 0.306 -0.041 0.041 -0.062 0.062 -0.210 0.210 -0.038 -0.083 0.021 D/A 
    1.000 -0.266 -0.227 -0.078 0.078 0.135 -0.135 -0.051 0.051 0.602 0.139 0.109 Bbrchs 
     1.000 -0.075 0.094 -0.094 0.016 -0.016 -0.097 0.097 -0.342 0.094 0.082 Price 
      1.000 -0.171 0.171 0.052 -0.052 -0.067 0.067 -0.096 0.007 -0.038 Quantity 
       1.000 -1.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.020 0.020 -0.084 0.080 -0.056 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.020 0.084 -0.080 0.056 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.089 -0.089 0.010 0.187 0.147 Dom. 
          1.000 -0.089 0.089 -0.010 -0.187 -0.147 Foreign 
           1.000 -1.000 -0.014 -0.071 0.006 Islam 
            1.000 0.014 0.071 -0.006 NonIsl. 
             1.000 -0.151 0.051 PCR 
              1000 0.091 PCB 
               1.000 Lerner 
                 
Info: Information. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. PCR: Public credit registries. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small 
banks. Lsize: Large banks. Open: Capital openness. Closed: Capital closedness. Domestic: Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: 
Quantity of Loans.  
5% critical value (two-tailed) = 0.0750 for n = 684 
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